The appointment however, is not greeted with universal approval by the industry (882 words)

Published: 7/18/2001

882 According to reports and not entirely unexpectedly since the air force handed over its updated requirements to Sukhoi at the end of May and given various government statements over the last few months, the government has decided that Sukhoi will lead the development and funding of the of the fifth generation Lightweight Frontline Fighter (LFI) and that it will be based on the technologies developed for the Su-37 Berkut, Su-27 family and the advanced trainer/light attack concept S-54/S-55 programs. The confirmation of the decision comes from Deputy Prime Minister Klebanov, and appears to be yet another nail in the coffin of MiG as a primary fighter design house. With the minister making it clear that a tender was seen as being unnecessary given that one designer had all the skills, although potentially MiG and Yakovlev bureaus would be contracted some of the design work. The government's decision to go with Sukhoi as the key contractor despite the opposition of RSK MiG, has not been accepted particularly graciously by MiG, who continue to insist that Sukhoi are not the lead contractor as no tender has been held. It is clear however, that Sukhoi's technological advantage has overcome MiG's offering despite the company's involvement on the ill-fated MFI fifth generation programme with the production of the Article 1.44. MiG losing out to what appears to be Sukhoi's irresistible dominance of Russian fighter design and manufacture buoyed by considerable order books, and having burnt many of its boats in the corridors of power by its pursuit of what was considered to by the air force to be both an expensive and inappropriate solution to the current circumstances of Russia. A view that was supported by Russia's traditional combat aircraft customers, who were reported to have declined to participate in the further development of the aircraft into a fighter project. According to reports both design houses submitted initial LFI proposals earlier this year, with reports that the Sukhoi' proposed a development of the S-55 single seat light attack fighter concept, a development of the S-54 advanced trainer, itself a scaled down single engine version of the Su-27. Neither th eS-54/55 are reported to have flown, but there have been reports of prototypes being built and models have been displayed since the mid 1990s The costs of the new largely composite aircraft vary significantly from $1 billion to $2-2.5 billion depending on whether one is speaking to MiG or Sukhoi, but the government is looking for Sukhoi to pull together a consortium of investors to fund the LFI. It seems very likely that foreign investors will participate in the consortium with India the most likely participant. India has already developed a close relationships with Sukhoi on the development of its toiling LCA programme, currently in danger of being obsolete even before it finally comes into service. Sukhoi has already offered the Indians a variant of the S-55 for carrier operations designated the S-56. The latter reportedly in an effort to dislodge MiG's MiG-29K from the lucrative India carrier based fighter acquisition. Other potential investors likely to be approached are likely to include China according to comments by the Russian Aerospace Agency General Director Yury Koptev. The development of the LFI is an essential requirement for the Russian combat aircraft industry if it is to remain competitive in the future in an export market that Alexei Fedorov, President of IAPO, that generated 8% of Russia's military exports in 2000, estimates could generate sales for the LFI over ten years of at least $1.1-1.2 billion. He however, emphasizes the need for government investment in the programme of a minimum of at least $500m to get the programe underway, but thinks the final cost could exceed $2-3 billion even if the programme derives heavily from existing aircraft. Federov remains concerned however, that the funding may not come quickly enough and therefore development fast enough, given that he estimates that the demand for the Su-27 family of aircraft will begin to slow considerably in 5-7 years time excluding license production, and even on today's timetable the aircraft is unlikely to see service before 2011 and 2012 very close to the potential export sales of the JSF, that is already flying. Federov's is also skeptical about the structure of the fifth generation programme and the approach taken by government in making one designer the lead contractor in the programme. Arguing that the structure giving one entity control is a disincentive to other participants to involve themselves fully in such a critical programme. He also believes leadership of the programme should come from the consortium of investors that have made significant commitments and if Sukhoi wishes to participate on that basis, otherwise it should simply seek to become a contractor to the consortium. He believes that the programme in the hands of government appointed designers will result in a programme orientated to the needs of the designer be it MiG or Sukhoi, and not to the economics of producing a viable product for the export market. Given Federov's early shots in the fight for future production it suggests that he is conscious that IAPO is outside the two new holdings and one of them is led by Sukhoi. Making it likely and companies closer to Sukhoi may be the recipients of the work if Sukhoi is not answerable to parties other than government.

Article ID: 2657